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Notes and Comments
WILLS-FORMALITIES FOR EXECUTION-PUBLICATION
AND ACKNOWLEDGMENT IN KENTUCKY
The requisites for a valid will under the Kentucky law are set
forth in Kentucky Revised Statutes sec. 394.040 which provides:
No will is valid unless it is in writing with the name of the testator
subscribed thereto by himself, or by some other person in his presence
and by his direction. If the will is not wholly written by the testator,
the subscription shall be made or the will acknowledged by him in
the presence of at least two credible witnesses, who shall subscribe
the will with their names in the presence of the testator.
That so much confusion could have arisen from such appareitly
clear statutory language is not easy to explain. Nevertheless, con-
fusion has arisen with regard to the necessary formalities prescribed
by it for the execution of a valid will. In some measure it may be due
to a rather careless use of terms by the Court of Appeals in cases
interpreting the statute as well as to the inherent inadequacy of
language as a vehicle for expression of legislative intention. The
court, at times, seems to have failed to differentiate between the
various methods of execution provided in the statute, nor have the
methods been clearly categorized. The following discussion is an
attempt to classify the cases dealing with publication and acknowledg-
ment so that the different methods by which a testator may execute a
valid will in Kentucky may be categorized and classified.
On its face, the statute seems to be clear in providing two alterna-
tive ways of execution of formal wills: (1) the testator may subscribe
the will in the presence of two witnesses;' or (2) the will may be
acknowledged by him in the presence of two witnesses. When the first
alternative is used, the signing and witnessing is all that is required.
Clearly, no further acknowledgment, publication, authentication or
other act by the testator is required.2 When, however, the testator
does not subscribe in the presence of witnesses, the statute seems
upon cursory examination to be equally clear in permitting, as a
second alternative means of execution, that a will may be acknowl-
edged in the presence of the witnesses. It is this alternative which
'The significance of the first sentence of the statute, stating that a will is not
valid unless subscribed by the testator or by another in his presence and by his
direction, will be considered infra.
'ATKINsoN, Wu.Ls 822 (2d ed. 1953).
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has caused confusion in the Kentucky cases with regard to what is
meant by acknowledgment of a will, and this method or alternative
has actually given rise to three distinct possibilities instead of merely
one, as might by supposed. Several questions arise, with respect to
which answers will be attempted: (1) Does acknowledgment of a will
mean that acknowledgment of the signature is sufficient? (2) Does
acknowledgment mean the same as "publication," viz., must the testator
acknowledge to the witnesses that the instrument they are signing is
his will? (3) Does the statute mean that a request by a testator that
witnesses sign an instrument which later proves to be the testator's
will, with his genuine signature thereon, is enough to satisfy the re-
quirement of acknowledgment? A fourth problem arises as incidental
to the alternative meanings of acknowledgment. Does it mean, when
considered in connection with the requirement that a valid will must
be subscribed by the testator, that a will must first be subscribed by
the testator at the time he acknowledges the will, or does it mean that
the signature of the testator need not be on his will if he acknowledges
to the witnesses that the instrument is his will and it is subsequently
proVed, at the time of probate, that his signature is genuine?
First, in answering the questions proposed, definition of the much
used words "publication" and "acknowledgment" might be helpful.
An orthodox definition of "publication" refers to the will and is de-
fined as "... the declaration or other manifestation by the testator to
the witnesses that the instrument is his will."3 The word "acknowledg-
ment," on the other hand, does not necessarily refer to the will, as dis-
tinguished from any other instrument, and has been defined as a for-
mal declaration before an authorized official, by the person who exe-
cuted the instrument, that it is his free act and deed."4 A contrast of the
two definitions shows that a "publication" requires a testator to inform
witnesses that the instrument in question is his will, while "acknowledg-
ment" merely requires that he apprise the witnesses of the fact that
such instrument is his free act. However, "acknowledgment" may
refer either to the will itself as the subject of acknowledgment' or to
the signature of the testator as such subject.6 In the former case
"Id. at 327. See also for similar definitions 57 Am. Jur. 219 (1948); 1 PAGE,
Wmis sec. 376 (3rd (Lifetime) ed. 1941).
SBLAcK's LAw DicnoNARY 39 (4th ed. 1951).
'Barton's Adm'r v. Barton, 244 S.W. 2d 770 (Ky. 1952); Robertson v.
Robertson 232 Ky. 572, 24 S.W. 2d 282 (1930) (where it is said acknowledgment
of will is implied from request to witnesses attest signature); Reed v. Hendrixs
Ex'r, 180 Ky. 57, 201 S.W. 482 (1918); see ATNSON, supra note 2 at 321, 323,
327, footnote 2. See also 57 Am. Jun. 229 (1948).
' See Robertson v. Robertson, supra note 5, at 574, 24 S.W. 2d at 283 to the
effect that acknowledgment is implied from a request to the witnesses to attest
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"acknowledgment" may be substantially the same as publication,7
depending upon whether it is acknowledged as being the testator's
will or merely as his act and deed.
The first possible meaning of the statutory requirement of acknowl-
edgment to be considered is that acknowledgment of the signature as
the testator's signature is sufficient. If the plain meaning of Kentucky
Revised Statute sec. 394.040 and a certain line of cases" are con-
sidered, it seems that the statute can only refer to the will as the
subject of acknowledgment. However, dictum in some Kentucky cases
indicates that acknowledgment by the testator of his signature on the
instrument before competent witnesses would be a sufficient com-
pliance with the statute and would be equivalent to "acknowledgment
of a will."9 The case of Robertson v. Robertson ° seems to state that
"acknowledgment of a will" is implied from a request to the witnesses
to attest the signature. In the relatively recent case of Lowrance v.
Moreland" the testator acknowledged his signature to only one of the
witnesses and both witnesses subscribed the will out of his presence.
The court held that the testator's will was not properly executed,
seemingly because his signature had not been acknowledged td one
of the witnesses, whom the testator had not requested to sign, and
because the witnesses did not subscribe in the presence of the testator.
The implication from the opinion is that the will would have been
properly executed if instead the testator had acknowledged his sig-
nature to both witnesses and if they had then subscribed the will in
his presence. It is submitted that this type of acknowledgment is
sound because it is a reasonable substitute for the testator's signing
the will in the presence of the witnesses, which the statute allows.
The fact remains, nevertheless, that acknowledgment of the signature
is different from the plain meaning of the phrase in the statute stating
that the will must be acknowledged. The legislative intention seems
to be in accord with the idea that the purpose of the acknowledgment
required is to assure that there will be proof that a will is the testators
the signature. See also Limbach v. Bolin (dictum to same effect) 169 Ky. 204,
183 S.W. 495 (1916); Flood v. Pragoff, 79 Ky. 607, 3 Ky. Law Rep. 372 (1881),
where it is said that witnesses to a will need not know its contents nor that the
instrument is a will, but they attest the genuineness of the signature merely.
ATmNsoN, supra note 2, 321; Evans, Incidents of Testamentary Execution, 16 Ky.
L. J. 199 at 204, 218-219 (1928); 57 Am. Jun. 229 (1948).
See supra note 2 at 327, footnote 2, where Professor Atkinson says that in
Kansas, Kentucky, Virginia, and West Virginia statutes provide for acknowledg-
ment of the will as distinguished from the signature. He states that acknowledg-
ment of the will is substantially the same as publication and thus says it would
seem that in these jurisdictions, if the witness did not see the testator sign, there
must be a publication. ' Supra note 5.
'Supra note 6. " Supra note 5. 1' 310 Ky. 533, 221 S.W. 2d 62 (1949).
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act. It thus is tenable that when the signature of a testator on a will
is acknowledged as genuine by him, there is a strong indication that
the will is his act. It may therefore be stated, despite some authority
to the contrary, that in Kentucky a testator's acknowledgment of his
previously subscribed signature on a will in the presence of two
subscribing witnesses satisfies the requirement of the Kentucky statute.
A second possible meaning of the requirement that a testator must
acknowledge his will (when he does not sign in the presence of wit-
nesses) is that a "publication" of his will is thereby required. Under
this view acknowledgment of a will is substantially the same as pub-
lication. Although one group of Kentucky cases clearly indicates that
a publication by the testator will satisfy the statutory requirement of
acknowledgment, 12 it does not follow that this is the only available
method. It is believed unnecessary to make known to the witnesses
that the instrument they are attesting is a will.
A third possible view is that a request by a testator that witnesses
sign an instrument which later proves to be his will, with his genuine
signature subscribed thereon, will satisfy the requirement that the will
must be acknowledged. 13 Although the language in the relatively
recent case of Barton's Admrri v. Barton 4 might indicate that a testator
must declare to witnesses that the instrument is the testator's will which
they are requested to sign, it seems that this position would place too
technical an interpretation on the requirement that the testator must
acknowledge his will. The language in this case (in which there was
a publication) would just as logically mean that all that is required
of the testator is that he acknowledge the instrument in question as his
act or deed. In the Barton case the court takes a liberal attitude and
reiterates the proposition that the Kentucky statute shall be liberally
construed. This third possibility available to a testator does not neces-
sarily require even that his signature must be on the will at the time
the witnesses sign.
The greatest confusion in the Kentucky decisions concerning
acknowledgment of a will or publication thereof occurs in cases in-
volving the question whether the signature of the testator must be
'- Supra note 5. See also the following older cases, under a Kentucky statute
requiring that a will be "attested" by witnesses: Allen v. Everett, 51 Ky. 371, 12 B.
Mon. 371 (1851); Swift and Wife v. Wiley, 40 Ky. 114 (1840); Shanks v.
Christopher, 10 Ky. 144 (1820); Cochran's Will, 6 Ky. 491 (1814).
' Robertson v. Robertson, supra note 5. See also PACE, supra note 3 at see.
379 where it is said: "If the Wills Act does not provide for ublication in express
terms, and merely provides that the attesting witnesses shall sign the will, it is
held, by the great weight of authority, that publication is not necessary; and that
the witnesses need not be informed that the instrument which they are attesting
and signing is a will." ' Supra note 5.
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first subscribed by him (or by someone at his direction) on the will
at the time the instrument is acknowledged by him to be his will. A
large number of the cases indicate that a will is not valid as a will and
cannot be validly acknowledged unless and until the signature of the
testator appears thereon.15 In contrast, another group of cases sup-
ports the more liberal proposition that a will is validly executed if the
testator indicates to the subscribing witnesses, who do not see the
testator sign and who do not see his signature on the will, that the
instrument in question is his will and his signature on it is later
proved to be genuine.' 6 Under this rule it is possible that a will
which has not yet been subscribed by the testator, at the time the
witnesses subscribe the will as witnesses, will be considered validly
executed. The liberal attitude of the Court of Appeals, in connection
with a presumption in favor of the idea that a will which the testator
acknowledges has first been signed by him, is manifested in the Barton
case. There the court states: "It is admitted that the signature of the
testator to the will in question is genuine, and that the two subscribing
witnesses signed the instrument in his presence. Under such conceded
facts, a prima facie case is made in favor of the due execution of the
will."1 7 This statement can mean that the requirement that a valid will
must first be subscribed is not completely abandoned, but in practical
effect, such a requirement carries little weight because of the presump-
tion that when all other formalities of execution are proved, the prior
subscription of the testator is presumed.
The Court of Appeals has been very reluctant to abandon the idea
' See Barton's Adm'r v. Barton, supra note 5 at 772. Although the opinion
in this case states that the will, and not the signature is the subject of acknowl-
edgment, it quotes from Robertson v. Robertson, cited supra note 5 at 574, 24
S.W. 2d at 283 which states that: "Until the document has been signed by the
testator it is no will and is not the complete expression of his testamentary in-
tention. Hence, it is generally held that the signing by the maker must precede
his acknowledgment and the signing by the witnesses... In the Barton case
the signature of the testator appeared on the will before the witnesses subscribed
their names. The case, however, manifested a liberal attitude. The opinion stated
that if it is admitted that the signature of the testator to the will in question is
genuine, and that the two subscribing witnesses signed the instrument in his
presence, under such conceded facts, a prima facie case is made in favor of due
execution of the will. Thus the case sets up a liberal presumption in favor of the
idea that a will has been first subscribed by a testator who acknowledges his will
to the witnesses. Other cases indicating that the testator's signature must be on
his will at the time the witnesses sign are Limbach v. Bolin, supra note 6, Shanks
v. Christopher and Cochran's Will, supra note 12.
" Strong dictum in Barton's Adm'r v. Barton, supra note 5, supports this
proposition. See also: Robertson v. Robertson, supra note 5 (in which case both
witnesses thoroughly understood that the instrument they signed as witnesses was
the testator's will, which she had requested them to witness, but they could not
say that the testator's signature was on the will at the time they signed); Reed v.
Hendrix's Ex'r, supra note 5.
" Barton's Ad'r v. Barton, supra note 5 at 772.
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that a valid will must first be signed by the testator before he acknowl-
edges it and before the witnesses subscribe. Clearly, this attitude of
the court is understandable when the first sentence of Kentucky Re-
vised Statute sec. 894.040 is considered, which plaifly states that no
will is valid unless the name of the testator is subscribed thereto. The
court, nevertheless, has recognized this technicality for what it is-a
mere technicality-and has made use of a liberal presumption that the
testator has signed his will before he presented it to the witnesses to
attest. It is believed that this attitude is sound and that so long as it
can be proved that the testator signs his will and acknowledges it as
his will, the purpose of the statute is fulfilled and there has been at
least a substantial compliance with it. Further, the statute merely says
that the will must be signed by the testator, but it does not specify
when it must be signed.' In Allen v. Everett19 the court went to the
extent of holding that where a testator published his will and caused
it to be witnessed by one person in his presence, and afterwards
signed it in the presence of another witness, it was a good execution
and publication. Dictum in- other cases supports the idea that a
testator's will does not have to be subscribed by him at the time the
witnesses subscribe if it can be proved that the testator actually
signed later.20
An examination of the statute and cases results in the following
conclusions. First, publication is not required in order that a will may
be validly executed, although it is one available method. This is true
because a testator may, as a second'possibility, sign in the presence
of the witnesses and thus avoid question concerning publication, and
because "acknowledgment of a will," provided for as a step in execu-
tion, is not the equivalent of "publication" in all circumstances within
the meaning of the statute. It is evident, nevertheless, that "acknowl-
edgment of a will" actually does involve a publication in most of the
Kentucky cases concerning this part of the statute. However, a re-
quest by a testator that the witnesses attest and sign an instrument
which the witnesses do not know is a will seems to be the equivalent
of acknowledgment of the will within Kentucky Revised Statute sec.
394.040 and is a third possibility. This seems sound because in such
a case the testator acknowledges that the instrument in question is his
act. A fourth possibility, indicated in some of the Kentucky cases, is
' In cases where the testator has signed in the presence of the witnesses,
after they have signed previously at his request, the Court has held that the order
of signing is not material and that attestation was in substantial conformity with
the statute. Examples are Singleton v. Singleton, 269 Ky. 330, 107 S.W. 2d 273
(1937) and Swift and Wife v. Wiley, 40 Ky. 114 (1840).
' 51 Ky. 371 (1851). Supra note 14.
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that acknowledgment by the testator of his signature will be a suf-
ficient compliance with the statute and will be the equivalent of
"acknowledgment of the will," although the statute states that the will
must be acknowledged and in spite of the fact that a number of cases
also state that the -will, and not the signature, is the subject of
acknowledgment. Kentucky Revised Statutes sec. 394.040, dealing
with proof of a will when witnesses thereto are unavailable, indicates
that the purpose of the statute is fulfilled when a testator's signature
on a will is proved to be genuine and seems to suggest that appearance
of a testator's genuine signature on a will indicates that the instrument
was intended to be his will.
As a practical matter, when a will is published or acknowledged
as the testator's will, his signature must almost always by subscribed
thereon at that time, although in some cases a liberal presumption
operates in favor of the conclusion that the testators signature was
already on the will at the time it was acknowledged. Of course, if
the testator acknowledges his will to the witnesses and then signs in
their presence this problem concerning the testator's signature is
unimportant. The lib~ral presumption in favor of the prior signing
of the testator in cases where his signature on a will is proved to be
genuine is believed to be sound. Proof of one's genuine signature on
a will is a good indication that the testator intended that the will
should take effect as such.
It is submitted that the meaning of "acknowledgment of a will"
should be clarified in future Kentucky cases. The Court of Appeals
should clearly state that "acknowledgment of a will" does not mean
that a testator must inform witnesses that the instrument in question
is his will (publish the will), but merely that he must indicate to them
that it is his act and deed. The mere request to sign or witness an
instrument, the identity of which is unknown to the witnesses, should
be sufficient.
P. JoAN SKAGGs
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF KENTUCKY WATER LAW
The 1954 Kentucky General Assembly substantially clarified the
rights of landowners to use the water resources on and contiguous to
their land by the enactment of sections 262.670 through 262.690 of
the Kentucky Revised Statutes.1 The legislature did not intend these
" For a complete analysis of sections 2962.670 through 262.690 of the Ky. REv.
STAT., see 44 Ky. L. J. 407 (1955).
